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CIVIL RIGHTS-THE SuPREM E

CIVIL

RIGHTS ACT OF

1866

COURT'S TERRIBLE SWIFT

SWORD:

THE

AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF PRIVATE

SCHOOLS-Runyon v. McCrary,

427 U.S. 160 (1976).

Plaintiffs, black children, were denied admission to defendants' private schools solely on the basis of race. The children's parents had

made applications for admission in response to brochures mailed to
"resident" and advertisements directed to the general public.' Alleging
that defendants had violated 42 U.S.C. § 19812 by denying plaintiffs
the same right to enter into contracts that was enjoyed by white applicants, plaintiffs filed a class action suit in federal district court. 3 The
district court enjoined defendants and intervenor Southern Independent School Association from further racial discrimination in their
admission practices. 4 A divided Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the injunction. 5 The Supreme Court affirmed in a 7-2
decision.6 Held: Because section 1981 reaches private acts of discrimination, it provides a remedy against a commercially operated, nonsec1. Two actions were consolidaied for trial. In the first, Michael McCrary and Colin
Gonzales, both black children, were refused admission to Bobbe's Private School in
Arlington, Virginia. Colin's father had responded to a brochure from Bobbe's Private
School mailed to "resident." Michael's mother had telephoned the school in response
to a yellow page advertisement. Both were told that only members of the Caucasian
race were admitted.
In the second action, Colin Gonzales was denied admission to Fairfax-Brewster
School in Fairfax County, Virginia. Prompted by the school's direct mail campaign
and yellow page advertising, Mr. and Mrs. Gonzales arranged by telephone to visit
Fairfax-Brewster School. After the visit, the school rejected the Gonzales' application,
explaining that the school was not integrated.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every state and territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, to be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
kind.
3. Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, 363 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Va. 1973). The
district court did not allow the case to be tried as a class action, but it did allow the
Southern Independent School Association to intervene as a party defendant. At the
time of the suit, the Association represented 395 private schools, many of which denied
admission to blacks. 427 U.S. at 164.
4. Neither Bobbe's Private School nor Fairfax-Brewster School had ever admitted
a black child since its opening (1958 and 1955, respectively). 427 U.S. at 165.
5. McCrary V.Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975) (4-3 decision).
6. Justice Stewart wrote the opinion for the Court. Justices Stevens and Powell
each filed concurring opinions. Justice White, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented.
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tarian, privately owned school's denial of admission solely on the basis
of race. 7 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
Runyon is the most recent addition to a line of cases which have
revitalized the Civil Rights Act of 1866, of which 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is
a part. These cases have construed the statute so as to prohibit various
private acts of discrimination in addition to discrimination of a public
nature. The process of revitalization has not, however, produced any
clear limit on the ultimate scope of the statute. The manner in which
the Court has rejected potentially limiting constitutional principles
makes difficult the task of drawing a line between presumably protected private discriminatory acts and discriminatory acts barred by
the 1866 Act. The focus of this Note is upon the development of
constitutional arguments which will permit the drawing of such a line
in a principled and rational fashion.
I.

THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866 AND ITS REBIRTH

In determining the source of section 1981, the Runyon Court concluded that the statute is a codification of section 1 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866. 8 Because the Court had previously decided in Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co.9 that another clause of section 110 prohibits private discrimination in the sale of real property, its conclusion that the
statute also bars discrimination in the formation of contracts was the
result of considerable reliance upon that holding. Thus, both the 1866
Act and the Jones decision which revitalized it are important to an
understanding of the Court's analysis in Runyon.
A.

The Civil Rights Act of 1866

The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was enacted pursuant to Congress'
power to enforce the thirteenth amendment."1 Congress enacted the
7. The Court also held that the plaintiffs' claim for damages was barred by the
Virginia statute of limitations for personal injury claims, and that an award of attorney's fees had been properly reversed by the court of appeals. 427 U.S. at 179-186.
8. See note 28 infra.
9. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970). a codification of part of § I of the 1866 Act, states:
"All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property."
I1. The 13th amendment provides that "neither slavery nor involuntary servitude
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statute partly because of doubts about the status of newly freed
slaves.' 2 Furthermore, many members of Congress believed that the
enactment of "Black Codes" throughout the South in 1865 and 1866
threatened to nullify the thirteenth amendment. These codes continued many incidents of slavery by restricting employment opportunities for blacks, limiting their right to testify, and disabling blacks from
owning real property. 13 In so doing, the Black Codes threatened to
exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. Section 2 gives Congress the power to enforce that declaration by appropriate legislation. The congressional debates on the 1866 Act make it
plain that Congress was exercising its § 2 powers. See, for example, the opening
remarks of Sen. Lyman Trumbull, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee and sponsor
...shall

of the bill: "I regard the bill ...

as the most important measure ...

since the adop-

tion of the constitutional amendment abolishing slavery. That amendment declared
that all persons in the United States should be free. This measure is intended to give
effect to that declaration and secure to all persons within the United States practical
freedom." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866).
12. Although the 13th amendment had ended slavery, it was not clear whether
former slaves were United States citizens or citizens of the states in which they lived.
The 1866 statute declared that all persons born in the United States were citizens
thereof. A number of senators attacked this provision as unconstitutional. For example,
Garret Davis of Kentucky, a leading spokesman for the Southern cause, argued that a
constitutional amendment would be required to make former slaves citizens. See
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 523-24 (1866). Citing the constitutional provision, giving Congress the power to establish "an uniform Rule of Naturalization," U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, he argued that only foreigners could be naturalized. Therefore, because blacks were not foreigners, only a constitutional amendment would enable
Congress to declare them citizens. At the other extreme, Sen. Lot Morrill, floor leader of a number of pieces of Reconstruction legislation, took the view that the newly
freed blacks were citizens by virtue of the 13th amendment alone. He thought the
declaration of citizenship in the 1866 Act had no force as an enactment, being simply
a declaration. CONG. GLOBE, supra at 570.
13. Within weeks after the adoption of the 13th amendment in December, 1865,
every confederate state except Arkansas and Texas had enacted Black Codes. See C.
FAIRMAN, VI HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: REcONSTRUC-

1864-88, PART ONE 105-06 (1971). Although the Codes appear
oppressive today, they were relatively moderate for their time and place. See C. FAIRMAN, supra at 110; Kohl, The Civil Rights Act of 1866, Its Hour Come Round at

TION AND REUNION,

Last: Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 55 VA. L. REV. 272 (1969).

The Mississippi Code, the first enacted, and the most stringent, was treated by Congress as a typical example of Southern recalcitrance. It permitted blacks to own personal, but not real, property. Land could not be leased to them except in incorporated
areas. Persons with one-eighth or more Negro blood could testify in court only
when another black was a party to the action. Nevertheless, this was a liberalization
of former statutes which had denied blacks any right to testify. If a black charged a
white with a crime, the court could impose a heavy fine or imprisonment if the
charge proved false and malicious. Blacks were required to find work by January,
1866, and to bind themselves for a year's labor. Quitting resulted in forfeiture of all
wages. The penal sections of the old slave codes were reenacted so as to apply to
freedmen. Every black between eighteen and sixty was taxed one dollar for the support of the Freedmen's Pauper Fund, and failure to pay the tax was prima facie evidence of vagrancy. In general, the goal of the Mississippi legislature was to retain
as much of the institution of slavery as possible, abandoning only so much of it as
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make the thirteenth amendment nothing but an empty statement of a
technical change in legal status.
Congress employed language in the 1866 Act to insure that local
authorities would be unable to deprive the newly freed slaves of
equality in civil rights. 14 Nevertheless, there were some people, including President Andrew Johnson, who believed that the attack on
local discriminatory statutes rendered the Act unconstitutional. 15 Lingering congressional doubts concerning the statute's constitutionality
may explain Congress' reenactment of the statute in the Civil Rights
Act of 187016 after passage of the fourteenth amendment. That
amendment gave Congress clear authority to disable the states from
enacting discriminatory statutes such as the Black Codes.
The 1866 statute is subject to two different interpretations. 17 The
first is that the statute guarantees nothing more than equality of civil
would induce the federal government to leave Mississippi alone. See C. FAIRMAN,
supra at 112-16.
The South Carolina Code was more typical. Blacks could own all forms of property
and were allowed to testify more freely. Although blacks were not limited to the
occupations of farmer or servant, annual license fees were required so that any other
type of work was generally unavailable. See C. FAIRMAN, supra at 116. See also
Casper, Jones v. Mayer: Clio, Bemused and Confused Muse, 1968 SuP. CT. REV. 89.
110.
14. Section I of the Act provided:
[A] II persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power,
excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United
States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous
condition of slavery or involuntary servitude . . . shall have the same right, in
every State and Territory of the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens,
. . . any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.
Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 3 1, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
15. The 14th amendment had not yet been adopted. In the absence of its guarantee of equal protection and due process under state law, many doubted that Congress
had authority to ride roughshod over state laws, statutes, ordinances, regulations, and
customs. President Andrew Johnson, vetoing the bill, did so on constitutional grounds.
See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1679 (1866). The bill was passed by both
houses of Congress over his veto. Id. at 1809, 1861.
16. Act of May31, 1870, ch. 114, §§ 16, 18, 16 Stat. 144. See note 28 infra.
17. Both the majority and the dissent in Runyon took the view that the proper
interpretation of the statute is apparent on its face. Quoting from Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 436 (1968), the majority stated that the 1866 Act "was
designed to do just what its terms suggest: to prohibit all racial discrimination,
whether or not under color of law, with respect to the rights enumerated therein."
427 U.S. at 170. The dissenters stated that the "statute means what it says and no
more, i.e., that it outlaws any legal rule disabling any person from making or enforcing a contract, but does not prohibit private racially motivated refusals to contract."
Id. at 195 (White, J., dissenting).
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status. It invalidates any legal rule that disables a nonwhite from
owning property or that renders void or voidable a contract entered
into by a nonwhite unless the same disability is visited upon whites.
Under this interpretation, the statute would not apply to the facts in
Runyon. It would apply to a case in which a defendant seeks to avoid
his contractual obligation by offering the defense that the contract
under the law of that jurisdiction is voidable because of plaintiffs
race. Viewed this way, the statute is aimed at states and state action,
8
not at the acts of private individuals.1
Under the second interpretation, the statute gives nonwhites a
right 19 to enter contracts which is "absolute" in the sense that a refusal
to contract on the basis of race is unlawful. Thus, a section 1981 right
to contract entails a correlative duty to contract for the breach of
which the law will provide a remedy. In Jones, a decision rendered
more than a century after the statute had been enacted, the Court gave
to the 1866 Act this second construction.
B.

Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.

Prior to Jones, the Court had discussed the reach of section 1 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 in dictum only, concluding each time that

the statute did not reach private acts of discrimination. 20 The Jones
18. The dissent adopted this view, which is consistent with its conclusion that
§ 1981 derives its constitutional support from the 14th amendment alone. 427 U.S. at
213. See note 28 infra.
19. The ambiguity of the term "right" in the context of §§ 1981 and 1982 is developed by Justice Harlan in his dissent in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. at
449. He notes that the ambiguous statement in § 1982 that all citizens have a "right"
to contract or to own property gives rise to two interpretations. Id. at 452-53. First,
the right may be "absolute," in which case it entails a correlative duty in someone
else not to refuse, e.g., to contract. See Hohfeld, Some FundamentalLegal Conceptions
as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30 (1913). Second, the right may
only denote legal capacity. In this sense, a right to own property or to contract refers
only to the lack of any legal disability to enter such relations.
20. The Reconstruction Court discussed the statute in dictum in two cases. See
Rives v. Virginia, 100 U.S. 313 (1897); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
In Rives the Court construed a section of the 1866 Act in connection with §§ 1981 and
1982. In general, the Court indicated that the various sections of the Act were intended to limit official action only. 100 U.S. at 317-18. Even as dictum, however,
that statement is of little value. The text of the opinion makes clear that the Court
thought that these provisions derived from the Act of 1870, not the 1866 Act.
In the Civil Rights Cases the Court discussed the 1866 Act and observed:
At that time (in 1866) congress did not assume, under the authority given by
the thirteenth amendment, to adjust what may be called the social rights of men
and races in the community; but only to declare and vindicate those fundamental
rights which appertain to the essence of citizenship, and the enjoyment or depriva-
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Court adopted a contrary position, holding that the 1866 Act prohibits a seller of real property from refusing to sell to a prospective
black buyer because of the buyer's race. 2 ' The Court determined that
the statute derives constitutional support from the thirteenth amendment.
The Jones decision caused considerable controversy. Critics
charged that the Court examined the legislative history of the Act
selectively and out of context to reach a result that would have
shocked the Congress of 1866.22 Those who agreed with the Jones
tion of which constitutes the essential distinction between freedom and slavery.
109 U.S. at 22. This case represents the most authoritative view of the Reconstruction
Court's understanding of this legislation. For a discussion of the congressional understanding, see note 22 infra.
Although the Civil Rights Cases took a narrow view of the statute, the Court did
indicate that the 13th amendment provided a constitutional base for more extensive
corrective legislation. Id. at 23. However, the Court appeared to retreat from that
constitutional position in two later cases. See Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. I
(1906); Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1925). In Hodges, the Court held that
the use of physical violence to prevent blacks from performing an employment contract was not violative of the 1866 Act. The Court indicated that such conduct could
not be reached under Congress' 13th amendment enforcement powers: "[L] t was not
the intent of the Amendment to denounce every act done to an individual which was
wrong if done to a free man, and yet justified in a condition of slavery." 203 U.S. at
19. In Corrigan, the Court cited Hodges for the proposition that the 13th amendment
which prohibits "enforced compulsory service of one to another does not in other
matters protect the individual rights of persons of the negro race." 271 U.S. at 330.
In holding that the 1866 Act does not prohibit restrictive racial covenants, the Court
stated that the statute does not "in any manner prohibit or invalidate contracts entered into by private individuals in respect to the control and disposition of their own
property." Id. at 33 1. Hodges was explicitly overruled by Jones. 392 U.S. at 441 n.78.
More recently, the Court considered 42 U.S.C. § 1982 in Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S.
24 (1948) and held that the enforcement of restrictive racial covenants by the District
of Columbia was barred by § 1982. The Court stated, however, that § 1982 did not
invalidate restrictive racial covenants entered into by private persons with respect to
private property. It cited Corriganfor the proposition that the statute was directed at
governmental action only. The Jones Court labeled the Hutrd construction of § 1982
dictum. 392 U.S. at 437 n.73. For an argument that the statement was a holding, see
Casper, supra note 13, at 129.
21. In Jones, a developer of a planned residential community refused to sell a
house to a black couple solely on account of their race. The couple sued on the theory that their § 1982 right to purchase property had been violated. Section 1982 provides that all citizens shall have the same right as white citizens to "inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970).
The Court had to decide whether that language simply removed any legal disabilities
or whether it imposed upon sellers a duty not to refuse to sell to potential purchasers
solely on the basis of race.
22. See the comments of Justice Stevens, concurring in Runyon:
There is no doubt in my mind that [the Court's] construction of the statute would
have amazed the legislators who voted for it. Both its language and the historical
setting in which it was enacted convince me that Congress intended only to guarantee all citizens the same legal capacity to make and enforce contracts, to obtain,
own, and convey property, and to litigate and give evidence. Moreover, since the
legislative history discloses an intent not to outlaw segregated public schools at
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decision argued that it is at least permitted if not compelled by the
statutory language.2 3 Although there is good reason to believe that the
that time, it is quite unrealistic to assume that Congress intended the broader result of prohibiting segregated private schools.
427 U.S. at 189-90.
The Court's reading of the legislative history is extensively criticized in C. FAIRMAN,
supra note 13, at 1218. He notes that the Court found a number of speeches in the
legislative record indicating that the purpose of the statute was to abolish racial discrimination, both official and private. These speeches, however, were addressed to a
clause in the first section which was later deleted. The clause in question read: "there
shall be no discrimination in civil rights or immunities dmong the inhabitants of any
State or Territory of the United States on account of race, color, or previous condition
of slavery." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866). The remarks of Rep.
Wilson in defense of this clause indicate that "civil rights and immunities" did not
mean "that all citizens shall sit on the juries, or that their children shall attend the
same schools." Id. at 1117. Rather, the expression was to be limited to the narrow
range of rights and immunities later adopted in the Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36, 76 (1872). Nevertheless, critics of the bill were concerned that the
statute might be read too broadly by the courts. Despite assurances that the statute
could not be used to override state regulation of voting, qualification for office, jury
service, or school attendance, the critics prevailed and the provision was deleted. See
C. FAIRMAN, supra note 13, at 1219.
It is interesting that the Court in Jones was aware of this history. Justice Stewart,
the author of the Jones opinion, had noted the deletion of the first clause of § I of the
1866 Act in Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966).
Fairman chides the Court for construing the statute as if it were a constitutional
provision and concludes that the construction of the statute developed in Jones is
without historical foundation. For other incisive criticisms of the Court's statutory
holding in Jones, see Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. at 449 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Casper, supra note 13; Ervin, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.: Judicial Activisin Run Riot, 22 VAND. L. REV. 485 (1969); Henkin, The Supreme Court, 1967
Term, Foreword: On Drawing Lines, 82 HARv. L. REV. 63, 95 (1968).
23. Commentators have generated three arguments in support of the result reached
in Jones. The first of these is that the language employed in § 1 of the 1866 Act indicates that Congress intended to reach private acts of discrimination. The Act grants
the rights conferred, "any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to the contrary notwithstanding." Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (emphasis added).
The use of the term "custom" is said to indicate congressional intent to go beyond
official action and to attack and prevent private acts of discrimination. See Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the Thirteenth Amendment,
12 Hous. L. REV. 1, 16 (1974); Kohl, The Civil Rights Act of 1866, Its Hour Come
Round at Last: Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 55 VA. L. REV. 272, 284 (1969). Kohl's
argument is that the Black Codes were not the chief concern of Congress in passing
the legislation. Rather, Congress wished to insure that the institution of slavery would
not be continued through private action. That result was to be prevented through the
1866 Act's attack on private discrimination. Kohl, supra at 276. There is considerable
evidence, however, that the term "custom" referred not to private action but to customary official action. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. at 457 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); C. FAIRMAN, supra note 13, at 1238-44. Although Professor Kohl concedes that there is evidence on both sides of the question, he concludes that "on balIf
ance the legislative history clearly justifies the Court's application of the Act ....
[B] y using the legislative history
the Court erred, it erred on the side of caution ....
properly, the Court could have extended the Act still further." Kohl, supra at 300.
The second argument is that the Court's interpretation is justified by the 13th amendment itself. See Note, The "New" Thirteenth Amendment: A Preliminary Analysis, 82
HARv. L. REV. 1294 (1969); Kinoy, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.: An Historic Step
Forward, 22 VAND. L. REV. 475 (1969). Professor Kinoy argues that the 13th amend-
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Jones construction of the 1866 Act is incorrect, 24 Runyon demon25
strates that the Court does not intend to back away from its position.
II.

THE REASONING OF THE RUNYON COURT

Before analyzing the issues presented by the case, the Court took
care to list the issues that were not presented. Accordingly, the Court
stated that the case did not involve the right of private social organizations to exclude prospective members on racial grounds; the right of
private schools to limit their clientele along religious or gender-based
ment is applicable to a case like Jones because "the herding together of black men,
women and children into the great ghettos of America is a remnant of the supposedly
outlawed system of human slavery." Id. at 479.
A third argument in support of the Jones decision is that, because the 1866 Act is
quasi-constitutional, its interpretation need not be limited by the intent of its framers.
See Levinson, New Perspectives on the Reconstruction Court, 26 STAN. L. REV. 461
(1974) (book review of C. FAIRMAN, supra note 13); Note, The Desegregation of
Private Schools: Is Section 1981 the Answer?, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1147 (1973). Conceding that the Court's opinion was "thoroughly slipshod in its analysis of the legislation's context," Levinson compares the statute to such seminal pieces of legislation as
the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Sherman Act, and The National Labor Relations Act.
Levinson, supra at 482. He concludes that the "Civil Rights Act of 1866 did manifest,
however imperfectly and ambivalently, a new order of freedom for the black man....
[0] ne should enquire whether the decision was permitted." Id. at 483 (emphasis in
original).
24. See note 22 supra.
25. Prior to Runyon, the Supreme Court had twice indicated that it would give
the Jones construction to § 1981. See Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n,
410 U.S. 431, 440 (1973); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454
(1975) (dictum). The statement in Tillmnan is arguably dictum. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. at 214 n.16 (White, J., dissenting). The Runyon Court refers to its
decision in Johnson as a holding that § 1981 reaches private conduct. 427 U.S. at 168
n.8. In that case, however, the § 1981 claim was dismissed as barred by the statute of
limitations; the language construing the statute is therefore dictum.
Prior to these decisions, the courts of appeals had extended the Jones holding to §
1981. The statute has been used most extensively in employment contracts. See, e.g.,
Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971); Barnett v. W.T.
Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1975); Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d
1097 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel
Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911
(1970); Payne v. Ford Motor Co., 461 F.2d 1107 (8th Cir. 1972); Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc., 478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
There are a number of decisions applying § 1981 in other areas of racial discrimination. The chief problem in these cases is not one of statutory construction, but one of
determining whether a contractual relation is involved. See Scott v. Young, 421 F.2d
143 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970) (denial of admission to private
recreational facility); Grier v. Specialized Skills, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 856 (W.D.N.C.
1971) (denial of admission to private technical school); United States v. Medical
Soc'y of S.C., 298 F. Supp. 145 (D.S.C. 1969) (denial of admission to private hospital); cf. Cook v. Advertister Co., 458 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1972) (refusal to print
plaintiff's social announcement on all-white society page not a violation of § 1981
because no contractual relation involved).
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lines; or the right of private schools to practice racial exclusion on religious grounds. 26 The Court's analysis was limited to two issues:
"whether § 1981 prohibits private, commercially operated, nonsectarian schools from denying admission to prospective students because
they are Negroes, and, if so, whether that federal law is constitutional
'27
as so applied."
A.

The Applicability of Section 1981
The Court first determined that section 1981 was derived from the

same source as section 1982--section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866.28 The Court then had little trouble concluding that the "absolute rights" interpretation which Jones gave to section 1982 should
26. 427 U.S. at 167. Because of its 13th amendment foundation, § 1981 is deemed
to reach only racial discrimination. Racial exclusion practiced for religious reasons
might be exempt from the statute by virtue of the free exercise clause of the first
amendment. Id. at 167 n.6.
27. Id. at 168.
28. The apparent cause of the uncertainty concerning the legislative source of §
1981 is a note appended to the Revised Statutes of 1874 which indicates that § 1977
(now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970)) was derived from the Civil Rights Act of
1870. Indeed, § 16 of the 1870 Act is substantially identical to § 1981. On the other
hand, the note appended to § 1978 of the Revised Statutes (now codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982 (1970)) indicates that that section was derived from the Civil Rights Act of
1866.
The historical notes following 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 also reflect this difference. They state that § 1981 derives from the 1870 Act while § 1982 derives from
the 1866 Act. On the basis of that difference, the dissent would have held that § 1982
was intended to reach private conduct under the 13th amendmerlt while § 1981 reaches
only state action under the 14th amendment. 427 U.S. at 213. The dissenters thus
concluded that the construction given § 1982 by the Court in Jones did not apply to §
1981.
In a lengthy footnote, 427 U.S. at 168 n.8, the Court met the historical argument
raised by the dissent. First, the Court noted that § 18 of the 1870 Act reenacted the
entire Civil Rights Act of 1866. Because § 16 of the 1870 Act likewise reenacted certain portions of § 1 of the 1866 Act (from which §§ 1981 and 1982 derive), the Court
concluded that the revisors of 1874 either overlooked § 18 or thought it superfluous
to mention this additional source.
The response of the dissenters to this point is that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 codifies a former code section that had been repealed. 427 U.S. at 206-07. The argument is as follows: Section 1977 of the Revised Statutes of 1874, giving to all persons "the same
right ... to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property" was derived by the revisor of the 1874 Code from the 1870 Civil Rights Act.
Section 1978, which survives today as 42 U.S.C. § 1982, provides that "[a] 11citizens
of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real
and personal property." The revisor's notes indicate that this section was derived from
the 1866 Act.
Therefore, reasoned the dissent, only part of the first section of the 1866 Act was
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also apply to section 1981.29 Thus, by refusing to enter into a contract
for educational services solely because of plaintiffs' race, defendants
denied plaintiffs the same opportunity to enter into contracts as they
extended to white offerees. 30 Section 1981, however, guarantees to all
citizens the same right to enter into contracts which white citizens
enjoy. Because Jones holds that this right creates a correlative duty
not to refuse to contract solely for racial reasons, defendants were
obliged not to refuse to contract. Their refusal to enter a contract with
plaintiffs solely for racial reasons constituted a "classic violation of
Section 1981.",3

B.

The Constitutionalityof Section 1981 as Applied

Defendants raised three constitutional issues, all of which the Court
rejected. They argued that section 1981, as applied to the conduct at
issue, infringed on defendants' freedom of association 32 and right to
privacy, 33 and violated parental rights to send children to private
schools offering specialized instruction. 34 With respect to the parental
codified in the Revised Statutes of 1874-the part which is now codified as § 1982. but
not the part now codified as § 1981. Section 5596 of the Revised Statutes of 1874
provides, however, that all acts of Congress passed prior to December 1, 1873, any
part of which appear therein, are repealed and replaced by the 1874 Code. The dissent concluded, therefore, that because part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was
codified, the remainder was repealed in 1874.
The Court rejected this argument on the ground that it could not believe that Congress intended to repeal a major piece of Reconstruction legislation on the basis of a
failure by the revisors of 1874 to include a reference to it in the notes. 427 U.S. at
168 n.8.
29. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
30. 427 U.S. at 170-71.
31. Id. at 172.
32. See generally Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U S.
539 (1963) (divulgence of membership lists violates right of association); NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (activities of NAACP protected as right of association); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (statute requiring teachers to list
their membership in organizations violates right of association); NAACP v. Alabama.
357 U.S. 449 (1958) (divulgence of membership lists violates right of association).
33. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to privacy includes
qualified right to abort fetus); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (statute prohibiting distribution of contraceptives violative of equal protection); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (statute making possession of obscene materials in the home
a crime violative of right to privacy); Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(statute making use of contraceptives a crime violative of right to privacy).
34. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (state may impose educational
standards on private schools even though it may not require attendance at public
schools); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (state law requiring parent
or guardian to send child to public school unconstitutional); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923) (state law prohibiting the teaching of foreign languages deprives
teachers and parents of liberty).
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right to send children to private schools, the Court noted that the right
is extremely limited and involves no right to be free of reasonable
government regulation. 3 5 As to the remaining defenses, the Court observed that private discrimination has never been held to derive
affirmative support from the constitution in the face of legislation
directed against it.36 The Court declined to extend any of the rights
relied upon by defendants so as to authorize private discrimination. 37
C.

The Powell Concurrence

Justice Powell indicated that he might well have voted to reverse if
the line of authority beginning with Jones had not stood in the way. 38
35. 427 U.S. at 176-78. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 402 (1923).
36. 427 U.S. at 176. See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470 (1973).
37. First, as to freedom of association, the Court agreed, 427 U.S. at 175, that
defendants' clientele have a right to associate "for the advancement of beliefs and
ideas." NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). The Court pointed out that
the right to associate to advance the idea that racial segregation is beneficial does not
entail the right to practice racial discrimination. 427 U.S. at 176. Apparently, defendants relied too heavily on dictum in Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973), that
"[i] nvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment." Id. at 470. That same opinion
qualified the statement by noting that such discrimination may be unlawful when it
becomes the subject of remedial legislation enacted pursuant to Congress' power to
enforce the 13th amendment. Because Runyon leaves the schools free to teach the
desirability of racial segregation, the Court did not perceive their inability to practice
such discrimination as a violation of any constitutional right of association.
Second, as to the constitutional right to send one's children to private school, the
Court noted the narrow scope that has been given to that right. 427 U.S. at 176-77.
See cases cited in note 34 supra. The right to send a child to private school has been
held not to entail a right to be free from reasonable state regulation. In Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Court commented that while the state "may not
pre-empt the educational process by requiring children to attend public schools,"
neither may parents "replace state educational requirements with their own idiosyncratic views of what knowledge a child needs to be a productive and happy member
of society." Id. at 239.
Defendant's third attempt to reach a constitutional issue involved the alplication of
cases finding a right to privacy in areas of abortion, home consumption of obscene
materials, and birth control. See cases cited in note 33 supra. The Court commented,
however, that this case "does not represent governmental intrusion into the privacy of
the home or a similarly intimate setting." 427 U.S. at 178. The Court noted that, although parental interests in educating children are related to the procreative rights protected in the privacy cases, the former have been given far less protection than the
latter. Id.
38. Justice Stevens, who also filed a separate concurring opinion, left no doubt
that he too would have voted to reverse but for Jones. He stated that for him "the
problem in these cases is whether to follow a line of authority which I firmly believe to have been incorrectly decided." 427 U.S. at 189. Although he considered his
misgivings concerning the validity of Jones, two considerations of greater force per-
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Because he felt bound by precedent, however, Justice Powell directed
the thrust of his concurrence toward cautioning against interpreting
the majority opinion in Runyon too broadly. Thus, his opinion is
helpful in identifying those private acts of discrimination which are
prohibited under section 1981.
Justice Powell observed that private action is an ambiguous term; it
is used to refer to nonstate action as well as to truly private nonpublic
action. The schools in Runyon were private in the first sense, but not
in the second. They were private in terms of their organization and
financing, but public in terms of their potential constituency. 39 This
distinction, in Powell's view, can provide the basis for a valid limitation of the Jones-Runyon holdings to public offers in which the offerors do not appear to have "any special reason for exercising an option of personal choice among those who responded to their public
offers." 40 On the other hand, a small instructional group open only to
pre-identified invitees is private in the nonpublic sense. Justice Powell's view is that a nonpublic offeror is not within the scope of section
1981. Although he realized that the line between the two types of private action might be difficult to draw in particular cases, he considered the distinction to be a workable one.
III.

THE SCOPE OF THE 1866 ACT

All the cases in the Jones-Runyon line have in common the fact
that the discriminatory act occurred in a course of public dealings. 41
It remains to be seen whether the Court will apply the 1866 Act to
situations in which the discriminatory act occurs in a private setting.
suaded him to vote with the majority. Id. at 190. The first of these was the stability in
the law engendered by a healthy respect for stare decisis. The second was that Jones,
although it probably misconstrues the intent of the 39th Congress, is consistent with
the mores and legislation of today. Therefore, because overturning Jones would be
symbolic of a step away from racial equality, Stevens reluctantly concurred. Id. at
191-92.
39. 427 U.S. at 188-89 (Powell, J., concurring). See also McCrary v. Runyon,
515 F.2d 1082, 1089 (4th Cir. 1975). The majority also indicated in a footnote that
the public nature of the school's actual and potential constituency was significant. 427
U.S. at 172 n.10. The majority's point, however, was that the schools' public nature
rendered unnecessary a discussion of the applicability of the private club exemption in
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1970). Justice Powell's point was
that the public constituency of the schools could provide the basis for limiting the
application of the 1866 Act.
40. 427 U.S. at 188.
41. See note 57 infra.
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The distinction between a commercial, public-oriented discriminator
and a truly private discriminator is intuitively appealing. However, the
positions adopted in Jones and Runyon undermine the doctrinal bases
upon which a principled distinction could be built. The first two sections of this Part will demonstrate that the Court's treatment of the
constitutional and statutory issues involved in the adjudication of this
area provides no basis for effectively limiting the scope of the 1866
Act. The third section will suggest an alternative analysis which provides a suitable limiting principle.
Potential ConstitutionalLimitations

A.

In Jones, the Court adopted the view that congressional regulation
of discriminatory conduct may be sustained under the thirteenth
amendment's enforcement clause unless the congressional determination that the conduct is a "badge and incident of slavery" is irrational.4 2 Moreover, the Court's liberal reading of the statute in Jones commits it to the view that Congress in 1866 made such a determination,4 3 and that the determination is not irrational. It follows that the
thirteenth amendment, enforced by the Act, reaches all acts of racial
discrimination, absent any countervailing considerations. The two
most reasonable countervailing factors are the discriminator's right of
association and his right to privacy." The Court's analysis of these
two rights, however, renders them ineffective as limiting principles.
Right of association

1.

The right
fied by the
freedom of
dictum that

to associate for the advancement of ideas has been identiCourt as a derivative of the first amendment right of
expression. 45 In addition, the Court has indicated in
associations are constitutionally protected even though

42.
43.

392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968).
"On its face . . . [the statute] appears to prohibit all discrimination against

44.

Defendants in Runyon also relied on parental rights to send children to private

Negroes . ... Our examination of the relevant history, however, persuades us that
Congress meant exactly what it said." Id. at 421-22 (emphasis in original).

schools. The Court's treatment of their contention will not be analyzed here, because

parental rights cannot provide a limitation on the 1866 Act outside the specific Run-

yon context. Even in that context, parental rights were rejected by the Court as a limiting principle. 427 U.S. at 176-77. See note 37 supra.
45.

See, e.g., cases cited in note 32 supra.
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the associational purpose does not include the advancement of ideas. 46
In Runyon, the Court ignored its statements from earlier cases and
restricted the right to associate to a first amendment context. 47 Since
the 1866 Act as interpreted in Runyon does not attempt to prevent
discriminators from gathering together to advocate racial discrimination, the right to associate cannot provide a limit on the scope of the
statute. A broader interpretation of associational rights would have
given the Court the chance to limit the statute through case by case
balancing of the discriminator's associational interest against the government's interest in eliminating the vestiges of slavery. 48 If the statute
is to be limited, alternative approaches will need to be developed.
2.

Right of privacy

A liberal reading of cases like Griswold v. Connecticut49 and Roe
v. Wade 50 discloses a right to be free from government regulation in
making decisions of personal and familial concern. After Runyon, that
interpretation must be limited. The Court in effect limited Griswold
and Roe v. Wade to their facts by stating that they apply only to procreative decisions. Moreover, the Court indicated that the privacy
cases will not be extended beyond "governmental intrusion into the
home or similarly intimate setting." 5 '
The apparent effect of the Court's treatment of the privacy cases is
that all activities which take place outside the narrow class of intimate
settings can be reached by the 1866 Act, and, therefore, the search for
limits on the scope of the 1866 Act must begin outside such intimate
settings. The refusal of the Court to rely upon the rights of association
46. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965), in which the Court
suggests that associations which provide social, legal, or economic benefits to members
are constitutionally protected.
47. 427 U.S. at 178. See also note 37 supra.
48. Even if the Court were to accept such a generalized right of association, it is
not clear that that right could provide a suitable limiting principle. It may be difficult
for private social and recreational groups to convince a court that their interest in
associational purity outweighs the countervailing governmental interest in eliminating the vestiges of slavery. See, e.g., Note, Federal Power to Regulate Private Discrimination: The Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruction Era A mendments, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 449 (1974); Note, Section 1981 and Private Groups: The
Right to Discriminate Versus Freedom from Discrimination, 84 YALE LJ. 1441
(1975). Moreover, it would be anomalous for a derivative constitutional right to outweigh an explicit constitutional proscription.
49. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
50. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
51. 427 U.S. at 178.
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and privacy to balance parental interests in sending children to specialized private schools against the governmental interest in enforcing
the thirteenth amendment suggests that these constitutional doctrines
do not limit the reach of the statute.
B.

Statutory Limitations

The Powell concurrence is an attempt to develop a statutory analysis that limits the 1866 Act to impersonal, commercial relationships.
In Powell's view, an offer is governed by the 1866 Act if it is part of a
widely offered commercial relationship which is not of such a per52
sonal nature that the offeror's selectivity is justified.
Justice Powell offered no authority in support of his distinction,
and indeed, it appears that none is available. Reliance on the legisla53
tive history has been foreclosed by the majority's statutory holdings.
Any reading of the legislative history sufficiently detailed to indicate

that the Act does not apply to personal relationships would also indicate that it does not apply to private sales of real property 54 or to pri55
vate schools.
An additional problem with the Powell analysis lies in the fact that
52. 427 U.S. at 188-89 (Powell, J., concurring).
53. It is significant that the two concurring opinions indicate that the legislative
history suggests that Jones was incorrectly decided. The concurrences are based largely
on stare decisis grounds. 427 U.S. at 186 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 189 (Stevens, J., concurring). Jones has acquired sufficient precedential weight to insure its
vitality without additional references to the 1866 Act's legislative history.
54. The excerpts from the legislative history collected by Justice Harlan in his
Jones dissent, 392 U.S. at 449-80, establish that Congress was aiming at official, not
private, discrimination. E.g., The Act "will have no operation in any State where the
laws are equal, where all persons have the same civil rights without regard to color
or race." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 476 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Trumbull);
"This bill in no manner interferes with the municipal regulations of any State which
protects all alike in their rights of person and property." Id. at 1761 (remarks of Sen.
Trumbull); "The bill does not reach mere private wrongs, but only those done under
[I] ts whole force is expended in defeating an attempt,
color of State authority ....
under State laws, to deprive races and the members thereof ... of the rights enumerated in this act. That is the whole of it." Id. at 1294 (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger).
The legislative history relied upon by the Court in Jones is chiefly from the debates
concerning a section of the Act which was deleted prior to passage. See C. FAIRMAN,
supra note 13, at 1219. See generally Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,
449-80 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); C. FAIRMAN, supra note 13, at 1207. See also
notes 22-23 supra.
55. Justice Stevens concludes that because the Act was intended to have no effect
on segregated public schools (see CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1294 (1866)
(remarks of Rep. Wilson, House sponsor of the bill)), a fortiori it was intended to
have no effect on segregated private schools. 424 U.S. at 189-90 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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the Act, in his view, protects offerees and not those to whom no offer
has been extended. 56 If this is the case, the discriminator may avoid
the Act by taking care in the selection of those to whom he extends
invitations. For example, a small music class which routinely extends
invitations to all white children within a small neighborhood area but
which excludes nonwhites within that area would be outside the proscription of the Act because it is not part of a widely offered commercial operation and because the relationship between teacher and pupil
in such a class is a personal one. At the same time, the discriminator's
conduct indicates that he had no reason for exercising any personal
choice; just as in Runyon, every white who wished to attend was able
to do so. The loophole which results for the knowledgeable discriminator surely is inconsistent with the majority interpretation of the
statute. Powell's suggestion as to how to limit the scope of the statute
57
must be rejected.
56. Both Justice Powell and the Court refer to plaintiffs as offerees and to defendants as offerors. See, e.g., 427 U.S. at 170-71, 187. Although it is possible that
the defendants' advertisements were requests for offers, the Court seemed to think
that the ads were specific enough to constitute offers.
57. An alternative mode of analysis, suggested but not developed both by the
Court and by Justice Powell, involves an analog of the recently abandoned public
function doctrine. Both opinions agree with the court of appeals that these " 'schools
are private only in the sense that they are managed by private persons and they are
not direct recipients of public funds. Their actual and potential constituency, however,
is more public than private.'" 427 U.S. at 172 n.10; id. at 188 (Powell, J., concurring)
(quoting McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082, 1089 (4th Cir. 1975)).
There is a strong parallel between several of the cases decided under the 1866 Act
and the now-abandoned public function strand of state action analysis. Through a
public function analysis, a nonstate actor may violate a 14th amendment right if the
actor is performing a function sufficiently similar to one performed by the state that it
can fairly be said that the state is acting. In the first public function case, Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), a company-owned town was not permitted to curtail
freedom of expression despite the fact that the land on which the town was located
was privately owned. A course of decisions gradually extended the doctrine. See Terry
v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (private political organization which in fact has
power of choosing public officials takes on attributes of government); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (private park could not be operated on racially restricted
basis because parks perform a traditionally public function) (alternative holding);
Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968)
(privately owned shopping center may not prohibit picketing of employees). But see
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), limiting Logan Valley to cases in
which the protest relates to the shopping center's function. The Lloyd dissenters' view
that Logan Valley had been overruled was expressly confirmed in Hudgens v. NLRB.
424 U.S. 507 (1976). It now appears that the doctrine applies only to situations in
which the government requires itself to provide a service. See Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (utility company which is required by state statute
to provide service does not violate due process clause of 14th amendment when it
shuts off service to customer without a hearing).
Although the public function strand may have been abandoned (aside from the
Marsh & Terry contexts) in state action cases, a similar principle has emerged in the
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C.

A Second Look at the Thirteenth Amendment

The preceding examination of the posture of the constitutional and
statutory issues surrounding the Civil Rights Act of 1866 indicates
that no satisfactory limiting principle is forthcoming from the Court's
statutory and constitutional analysis. That conclusion could have been
avoided in one of two ways. First, the Court could have given to the
1866 statute an historically accurate construction. 58 Second, the
Court could have articulated the rational relation which a statute must
bear to the continuing vestiges of the institution of slavery in order to
be sustained as an enforcement of the thirteenth amendment. The first
alternative would have required overruling Jones. Given the limitations imposed by stare decisis, that result is not to be expected in the
near future. It is not too late, however, for the Court to indicate the
contours of the rational relation first developed in Jones.
Ideally, the rational relation required of a congressional enactment
under the thirteenth amendment should be something more than ninimal rationality. The condition attacked by the statute should bear a
real and substantial relation to the historical institution of involuntary
servitude. The reasons for a narrow reading have been developed
cases decided under the 1866 Act. Thus, Jones bears a family resemblance to Marsh.
The fully planned community may be a functional equivalent to the company towns of
yesterday. If it can be said that the development in Jones is performing a sufficiently
public function to impose 14th amendment limits, it is clear that the developer's conduct would constitute a violation of equal protection. Similarly, the recreational facilities in Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreational Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973), and
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969), can be likened to the park in
Evans v. Newton. Each facility was open to all persons within a given geographical
area, provided such persons were white. The Court might have applied the public
function doctrine in those cases upon the same basis as the alternative holding in
Evans v. Newton, i.e., the operators were performing a traditionally municipal function. Finally, the private schools in Runyon were performing what has come to be a
traditional public function. Indeed, the operation of schools is a function which the
states require themselves or their subdivisions to provide.
Employment cases aside, any of these Jones-Runyon cases could have been decided
under a public function analysis had the Court been so inclined. Indeed, it appears
that something very similar to the public function analysis has emerged in the cases
decided under the 1866 Act, but with an important difference-the doctrine has expanded the scope of the 14th amendment, but would operate as a limitation on the
reach of the 13th. For a further discussion of the relationship of the public function
doctrine to private school discrimination, see Note, The Wall of Racial Separation: The
Role of Private and ParochialSchools in Racial Integration, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 514,
517 (1968).
Although the public function doctrine marks the contours of the limitation which
Justice Powell wishes to impose upon the 1866 Act, it must be concluded that, after
Hudgens v. NLRB, it cannot provide the doctrinal base for the limitation.
58. See note 22 supra. But see note 23 supra.
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elsewhere5 9 but may be summarized briefly. First, the purpose of the
framers of the thirteenth amendment was to accomplish emancipation
of slaves, not to end racial discrimination. Second, to achieve this
purpose, the framers did not use general terms purposefully left to
gather meaning over the decades; rather, they used the specific terms
"slavery" and "involuntary servitude" to indicate that it was this particular institution, and no other, which they wished to destroy. Third,
the amendment is a direct copy of a section of the Northwest Ordinance
which itself had been narrowly construed to apply to slavery but not
to racial discrimination.
Limiting the thirteenth amendment to conditions which are actual
vestiges of the historical institution of slavery still permits Congress to
reach certain nonstate acts of discrimination. Because the historical
incidents of slavery included the inability to own property and to
choose one's occupation, the results in several of the cases following
Jones can be sustained on a narrow reading of the thirteenth amendment, assuming that appropriate legislation is enacted. 60 At the same
time, most private discriminatory acts of the type described by Justice
Powell will not be within Congress' enforcement power because such
truly private discriminatory acts cannot be said to bear a sufficiently
strong relationship to the institution of involuntary servitude. Racial
groups who were never enslaved have been the victims of such discrimination. 6 1 Areas in which slavery was practiced in the past in
some cases have more racially tolerant climates than others in which
the institution never existed. 62 While the relationship between slavery
and private racial discrimination may be able to pass a minimum rationality test, it surely is not strong enough to pass a test based upon
historical realities.
Limiting the thirteenth amendment to historical vestiges of slavery
is a rational solution, but is practically impossible. Even though
slavery and racial discrimination are not necessarily causally connected, any attempt to identify particular discriminatory acts as
59. Note, The "New" Thirteenth Amendment: A Preliminary Analysis, 82 HARV.
L. REV. 1294 (1969).
60. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreational Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973), and
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969), involved the effect of the 1866
Act upon private discrimination in the sale and ownership of real property. Johnson
v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975) indicates in dictum that the
statute applies to employment discrimination. See also cases cited in note 25 supra.
61.
E.g., Native Americans, Orientals, and Hispanics.
62. Compare the United States with Rhodesia. which never practiced slavery.
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badges of slavery by receiving the opinions of historians and sociologists is likely to involve the courts in a monumental and unresolvable
battle of experts. The problem for the Court is to identify some characteristic which is representative of the abuses of slavery, even though
it is not demonstrably the fruit of that institution.
The position developed by the first Justice Harlan in his dissent in
the Civil Rights Cases63 offers such a compromise. It was Justice Harlan's view that the enforcement clause of the thirteenth amendment
authorizes Congress to enact laws which prohibit discriminators from
denying anyone a legal right on account of race. Since the essence of
the slave system was the deprivation of fundamental human liberties,
the abolition of slavery "necessarily involved immunity from, and protection against, all discrimination against [former slaves], because of
their race, in respect of such civil rights as belong to freemen of other
64
races."
Limiting the thirteenth amendment to the protection of legal rights
has two advantages. First, it enables the Court to draw a principled
line between permissible and impermissible discrimination. Certainly
those discriminatory acts which deny their victim something to which
he is entitled are more offensive than those private acts which involve
a refusal to confer a benefit. The implication of an act which denies
someone a legal right is at least in part that the victim is not the civil
equal of the discriminator. It is not difficult to detect the lingering
odor of slavery in such an act. The refusal to confer a benefit upon
members of other racial, ethnic, or religious groups--such as a refusal
to extend invitations to Justice Powell's private music class-carries
an implication considerably less strong. When one has been denied a
benefit to which he had no legal right, it is difficult to argue that the
constitutional proscription of slavery has been violated.
The second advantage of a legal rights test is the ease with which
the courts can apply it. The conceptual equipment necessary to identify legal rights is. possessed by the federal bench in abundance, and
the newly revived thirteenth amendment and the 1866 Act could settle
63. 109 U.S. 3, 59-62 (1883).
64. Id. at 36.
65. The distinction between a right and a privilege is hardly novel and has at times
assumed constitutional dimensions. In the past, it has been held that a benefit may be
denied without a hearing if the benefit is a privilege, but not if it is a right. See generally
I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE §§ 7.1 1-.20 (1958). However, the classification of an entitlement as a right or a privilege in this context no longer determines
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into predictable, rational channels after a few cases had drawn the
line between right and privilege in this setting. 65
IV.

CONCLUSION

The decisions construing the 1866 Civil Rights Act have used language so broad as to suggest that there are no effective limits to the
ban the statute imposes upon racially discriminatory acts. The Court
has rejected two constitutional arguments-freedom of association
and the right to privacy-which would limit the Act by protecting the
discriminator. Limiting the scope of the statute by defining the constitutional prohibition of slavery is a rational alternative. Ideally, this
process would involve a detailed case by case analysis of each condition attacked under the statute to determine whether that condition is
an historical remnant of slavery. In practice, reasoned judgments on
such questions are impossible. A suitable compromise is found in Justice Harlan's view that Congress is authorized by the thirteenth
amendment to enact legislation which prohibits the denial of legal
rights on account of race. If the 1866 Act applies only to the denial of
legal rights, a workable balance of competing interests can be
achieved. The power of the federal government will be available to
remedy the outrage of racially motivated denials of legal rights. At the
same time, that power will not be employed to adjust the relations of
citizens in those areas of conduct within which members of our society
have always exercised freedom of choice.
Gerald Bresslour

the necessity of a hearing. See, e.g., Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (hearing may be required when non-tenured teacher at state university is denied reappointment after a series of one-year contracts); Bell v. Burson. 402 U.S. 593 (1971)

(state may not suspend driver's license without a hearing, naming the entitlement to
the license a right or a privilege irrelevant); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)
(welfare benefits may not be terminated without a hearing regardless of right/privilege
classification).
Nevertheless, in other contexts, "some interests do not deserve legal protection and

may properly be called 'privileges.' The concept of 'right' or 'legal right' cannot be
abolished. It will continue. So will the concept of 'no right' or 'lack of right.' " K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 7.00-8 at 264 (1976).
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